A research oriented model of Ego States

Stefan Sandström 2015

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Abstract

This article argues that it is advantageous to found Ego State theory on the natural phenomena of memory and thereby to link it to memory research, the major advantage being the direct link it provides to natural science.. It also suggests how this can be done, and how the result can be used to enhance behavioural science studies as well, by using structuralist research methods.

PART 1 – Ego states and memory from the viewpoint of Natural Science

There were two major influences on Eric Berne’s Ego State theory. One came from Paul Federn, his analyst, who developed the original ego state theory, where ego states were seen as states of the psychoanalytic ego (and portions of the super-ego that had ‘ego quality’). This theory was abandoned by Berne, which he made explicit in TA in Psychotherapy (1961) where he wrote:

"Parent, Adult and Child are not concepts like Superego, Ego and Id, or the Jungian constructs, but phenomenological realities..."

The other big influence came from the Canadian neurosurgeon Wilder Pennfield who evoked what he considered to be memories by electrically stimulating the cortex of the brains temporal lobes of epileptic patients. This led Berne to state (1961) that

“Pennfield has demonstrated that in epileptic subjects memories are retained in their natural form as ego states.”

It should be noted that this link to memories, and nothing else, is what makes the Ego State theory phenomenological.

Pennfield findings were later questioned by Mahl et al. 1964, and also by Horowitz M J and Adams 1970 who did not find that the procedure elicited memories, but rather hallucinations or phenomena classed as primary process. It might be noted that neither study replicated Pennfield’s experiment since they stimulated the sub-cortical tissue and in the case of Horowitz and Adams also the hippocampus instead of the cortex. The reason for this is that new technology was made available at the time of their experiments. It was not discussed in the articles if this might have yielded a different result.

That Pennfield’s conclusions were put into question is probably the main reason for the trend not to bring up his experiment in TA trainings. It could perhaps also be the reason for the TA-community moving away from explicit reference to memory and neuroscience as a base for Ego States. This, however, might be premature. There is no reason why the linking of Ego States and memories should depend solely on the research of Pennfield, whether he or his critics are right.

The usefulness of linking Ego State theory to memory

If we can find a way to link Ego State theory to memory research, there follows a number of advantages:

·      We have a direct link to natural science.

·      It provides a substantial evidence base for Ego States.

·      It roots Ego State theory in phenomenology.

·      We can learn more about the nature of Ego States as memory research advances.

·      We may be able to publish articles on Ego States as memory research.

·      This gives us an advantage since it would be unique in personality psychology.

From our side we can contribute to memory research by describing:

·      Memory as a base for identity.

·      Memory as a base for thinking/feeling/acting in the here and now.

·      Dealing with relationships between memory and phenomena such as transference, countertransference, repetition compulsion etc.

·      Memory as a basis for psychopathology and for health.

·      And much more…..

A brief description of memory theory

All meaningful mental activities are based on memory.

If we did not remember them, we could do nothing with them and it would therefore amount to nothing.

The first process of memory is called sensory register lasting only a few seconds. This is usually enough time to identify a perception. If the input is important enough to notice, it proceeds into the short-term memory (STM) where it may dwell from between a few seconds to a few hours. If it is really interesting, or if we rehearse it properly in order not to forget it, it is transformed into a long-term memory (LTM).

If it does not find it’s way into LTM it is lost forever and cannot be retrieved.

The LTM can be understood to have three modi:

·      Semantic memory concerned with meaning and facts (The battle of Hastings took place in 1066).

·      Declarative memory; words, meaning (“Shalt I compare thee to a summers day?...”).

·      Procedural memory; practical skills that have been learned (driving a car, swimming).

Initially, when we experience something, we retain it as an episodic memory. This is a very normal modus for an autobiographical memory, but is also the way we take in facts in school. We first remember the episode where Mrs Andersson taught us about the battle of Hastings. Later this memory is stripped of its episodic content and reduced to one or several semantic memory(ies) (fact). After this transformation it is still possible to recall the event as an episode, voluntarily or involuntarily, though it is more the exception than the rule. Conway et alt. (1992) showed that students of a college class initially retained learning as episodes. Tested several months later these memories turned out to be stored as semantic memories.

Memories that are not forgot are gradually consolidated and eventually become long-lasting memory (Mc Gaugh, 2000). They can be re-activated and come back to the Working Memory, which is the “desk-top” where we actively relate to memories and sensory input in the present. As these memories are retrieved they also become vulnerable to change, for better or for worse: they can be falsified or completed and expanded with other memories, aspects that become conscious, new maturity in the subject etc. This is made possible not least because the hippocampus, which is active in the formation of new memories, becomes activated under such circumstances.

Memory and Ego States

Eric Berne wrote, in Games people play (1964):

“The human brain is the organ and organizer of psychic life, and its products are organized and stored in the form of ego states.... There are other sorting systems at various levels, such as factual memory, but the natural form of experience itself is in shifting states of mind.”

 Not that we have to follow Berne’s ideas at all times, but the man had good instincts. Here he makes a distinction between Ego States and Factual memory.

It would be possible to attribute the following qualities to Ego States:

Parent and Child are:

·      LTM

·      Episodic

·      Basis for thinking, feeling and acting in the present.

They are formed after memories of living subjects with consciousness: C after myself and P after people, but also after living beings (pets) and even in-animate matter – if antropomorphised (“My tomatoes love me!”).

Adult is:

·      Here and now-oriented

·      Draws on sensory register and STM, to deal with the present.

·      With the ability to reflect on other memories that can be LTM, such as other Ego States, facts, abilities etc.

In this model we let Adult be active constantly:

·      Alone – what we call “being in Adult” or

·      Simultaneously with P or C – what we call P or C.

The reason for this is that we either would have to see consciousness as a separate factor that is attributed to all three ego states or as constantly active. If not we would be conscious only of the original situation, when the memory was formed, and dangerously oblivious of the actual physical environment when we are in P or C, with potentially catastrophic consequences (falling down stairs, walking into walls, being hit by cars etc.). In Wilder Pennfield’s experiment, and in Mahl et al. and, Horowitz M J and Adams’s as well, we should note that the subjects were simultaneously aware of the memory or hallucination and the actual surroundings.

Another alternative is to see consciousness as a separate attribute to all types of ego states, which lends itself to the Ego State that is active in a given moment. If so we have to solve the riddle of what becomes of the Adult. However, if the Adult is not founded in the immediate contact with the here and now, it would be based on memories of patterns of thinking feeling and acting, and then it would be either a Parent or a Child Ego State, which is obviously absurd,

If we see the Adult as constantly active, the Adult will maintain its properties as the here and now-oriented Ego State. The idea that two ego states can be active simultaneously was put forward by Berne in “TA in psychotherapy” (1961) where he suggested that one Ego State can be influencing and one executive (To be clear: This is not what I am proposing here).

Adult as Working Memory

Working Memory is, like a “desktop” in the mind or what we work with at a given moment. Baddely A, Eysenck M W and Anderson M C (2009) describe it as “a system…for temporary maintenance and manipulation of information…helpful in performing many complex tasks”. Miyake and Shah (1999a) write, “Working memory is assumed to be linked to attention, and able to draw on other resources within LTM and STM.”

What if we say that the working memory is a function of the Adult Ego State? It then takes in information from the sensory register and STM in the present while any ego state – P, A or C – can then process it emotionally and cognitively and draw on LTM for experience and knowledge.

Ego States change over time

It has been found in memory research (see Baddely A Eysenck M W and Anderson MC, 2009) that memories change considerably over time. Ego States may change for many reasons, such as:

·      Part of an ES that was unconscious becomes conscious.

·      Part of an ES is forgotten or repressed.

·      Forgotten parts are recalled.

·      Previously remembered parts may be forgotten.

·      The subject matures, has increased life experience, learns new facts, changes life-orientation and therefore interprets memories differently.

PART II: Organising Ego States – possible directions for behavioural sciences

Structuralism offers a great potential for organising Ego States (Lévi-Strauss 1973, Piaget 1968).  The structuralist theory of science was originally a linguistic theory, founded by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure in the early 1900 (1916), and later attracted such renowned followers as Roman Jacobson and the Prague circle, as well as Noam Chomsky (1957).

In the 1950ies Claude Lévi-Strauss transferred the theory to anthropology and from that it spread quickly in behavioural and human sciences, to philosophy, sociology, literature, mathematics, Marxism and psychology. Two of the most famous structuralist psychologists were Jean Piaget, who treated cognition and cognitive development as structures, and psychoanalyst Jaques Lacan, who saw the unconscious as a language of it’s own (structure).

To understand structuralism it is necessary to understand what a structure is:

A self-regulating system where the totality is more than the sum of the parts.

(For a transactional analyst Games, the Script, the Script-system and several other concepts immediately come to mind). The structure is such that adding or withdrawing one component changes the meaning of the whole system to some degree. Since it is derived from linguistics there is also frequently an emphasis on its isomorphy, that it can be translated.

I would, in this context, like to consider Ego States as separate episodic memories that constitute structures on a basic level and on a higher level form structures together with other Ego states, thereby creating meaning, experience and personality.

Thematic groupings of Ego States (TGE)

Referring to the concept R.I.G or Representation of Internal Generalised Experience (Sterne, 1985) I would like to substitute this term, in this  particular context, with Thematic Groupings of Ego States (TGE), which then would be a special case of R.I.Gs. A simple Ego State is here seen as a separate memory of a particular episode. Together with other Ego States they chunk together (by association) and as a system they constitute the meaning of a theme or concept. Various episodes around the breakfast-theme from my life thus come together forming a structure and make up the meaning of “breakfast” for me. When I was 14 years old visiting my American relatives in Massachusetts our first joint breakfast included roast veal and white wine, which henceforward changed the boundaries of my definition of “breakfast”. One new element (Ego State, episode) changed the meaning of the system.

In this way we develop associative networks between myriads of Ego State to cover myriads of topics, though only some of these will probably be of immediate interest for transactional analysts. We can find interesting individual structures around themes such as Gouldings injunctions, Script, Script-systems, attachment etc. When we consider a TGE that is concerned with intimacy, where the result of the existing system is frustration of intimacy, adding another element – e.g. the experience of intimacy – may change the meaning of the system (redecesion).

We can also see the Ego States as systems from the aspect of psychic organs (Archeopsyche, Neopsyche, Exteropsyche; Berne 1961), so that Adult, Child and Parent Ego States form structures as whole entities that cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts:

·      Child = me when I act, think, feel like I did when I was a kid.

·      Parent = me when I act, think, feel like someone I have met.

·      Adult = me in the here and now, without historic influence.

This permits us to treat the Ego State as real entities, for as Berne writes (1961):

“The trichotomy must be taken quite literally. It is just as if each patient were three different people. Until the therapist can perceive it this way, he is not ready to use this system effectively.”

                                                                                                                                  Fig 1

We could also make up behavioural structures, cognitive structures and emotional structures and study their interplay, or we can conceive of a hierarchy of structures, like in the figure bellow, and study the meaning at different levels.

At this point some readers may think that we are back to where we started with: Classical Bernian TA. So what is to be gained by this deviation? Well for one thing it lets us piece together each experience, theme, injunction etc. directly from the stuff of which they are made: memories, and to understand them in the light of the findings of a natural science discipline.

Imagination and scientific curiosity will set the limits for how this method can be applied. If we take an example from the comparative study of cultures, we may consider that the structure of one culture can be broken down into beliefs, customs, opinions, expressions, etc. that form the structure of a distinct culture, and then that this will be represented as TGEs in its individual members (celebrating Easter holiday, Ramadan etc.). Then we can determine what it takes to be considered to be a typical or atypical part of this culture or not at all to belong to it.

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References:

Assoun P-L, (2003) Lacan, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris

Baddely A Eysenck M W and Anderson M C, (2009) Memory , Psychology Press, New York

Berne E, (1961) Transactional Analysis in psychotherapy, Souvenir Press, New York

Berne E, (1964) Games people play, Ballentine Books, New York

Berne E, (1966) Principles of group treatment, Grove Press, New York

Chomsky N, (1957) Syntactic structures, Mouton de Gruyter, Haag

Conway M A, Cohen G and Stanhope, N M (1992) Very long-term memory for knowledge acquired at school and university, Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6, 467-482

De Saussure F, (1916) Cours de linguistic générale, Grande Bibliotehèque Payot

Federn P (1953) Ego psychology and the psychoses, Maresfield reprints, London

Horowitz M J and Adams (1970) Hallucinations on Brain Stimulation: Evidence for revision of the Pennfield Hypothesis in Origin and mechanisms of hallucination (1970), Kemp W ed., Springer, New York

Levi-Strauss, Claude. Anthropologie structurale deux (1973), Pion, Paris

Mahl et al. (1964) Psychological responses in the Human to Intercerebral Electrical            Stimulation, Psychosomatic Medicine, July 1964

McGaugh, J L (2000) Memory - - a Scentury of Consolidation, Science Vol.287 no 5451 pp. 248-251

Miyake A and Shah P (1999) Models of active maintenance and executive control, Camebridge University Press, United States

Piaget J (1968) Structuralisme, Presses Universitaire de France, Paris

Sandström S (2009) Writings – on Transactionl Analysis, Magenta, Göteborg

Stern D (1985) The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology, Basic Books, New York

Please don't comment this blogg.
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